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REPRODUCING VALUE: HOW TAX LAW
DIFFERENTIALLY VALUES FERTILITY, SEXUALITY
& MARRIAGE
TESSA DAVIS*
Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code permits a deduction for an
individual’s fertility expenses, but it does not do so evenhandedly. This paper
focuses on the current discriminatory effects of Section 213 doctrine as it is applied
to the deductibility of fertility treatments for single persons and or homosexual
couples, as compared to heterosexual, married couples. Traditional economic
analysis of the Code fails to explain such discrimination, thus a new approach is
required. Utilizing tools from anthropological theory, this paper recognizes and
analyzes our tax code—and specifically Section 213—as a cultural artifact and
therein challenges the presumed objectivity of our conception of what is
“medical,” “natural/normal” reproduction, and “fertility/infertility.”
By
revealing and reforming the normative consistencies underlying the seemingly
inconsistent pre- and post-Magdalin v. Commissioner Section 213 doctrine, this
Article proposes that we can embrace new forms of parenthood enabled by
reproductive technologies and remedy the current discriminatory application of
Section 213 as applied to fertility treatment expenses.

INTRODUCTION
“Power may operate at the levels of ideas, persuading the mind of its
legitimacy . . . .” 1
“[T]axes are what we pay for civilized society . . . .” 2

Taxes and culture have marched hand-in-hand throughout history. It would
seem fitting, therefore, to study our tax code as a cultural artifact. Contemporary

*Visiting Assistant Professor, Tulane University Law School. I would like to thank Curtis Bridgeman
for the many hours spent talking and developing this paper, Gregg Polsky and Seth Davis for their
comments and encouragement, Karen Sandrik for her thoughts and advice on entering the world of legal
academia and Steve Sheffrin and the Murphy Institute Public Policy Working Group. Any errors are, of
course, my own.
1 Timothy Mitchell, Everyday Metaphors of Power, 19 THEORY AND SOC’Y 545 (1990).
2 Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100
(1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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tax scholarship, however, is limited in this regard. 3 Yet it should not be. When
viewed through the lenses of culture and history, the tax code’s puzzles may seem
far less puzzling. Indeed, doctrinal disarray may reveal itself as reproducing hidden
value judgments.
Consider, for example, Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code, a section
that provides taxpayers a deduction for qualifying medical care expenses. 4 Current
Section 213 doctrine, as applied to the costs of fertility treatments, makes little
sense on its face. There is a marked disjunct between, on the one hand, the IRS’s
position in Sedgwick v. Commissioner 5 and Magdalin v. Commissioner, 6 the key
cases, and, on the other, IRS Publications, Revenue Rulings, Memoranda and
Letters on the deductibility of fertility treatments and other medical expenses. 7
Post-Sedgwick/Magdalin 8 Section 213 doctrine discriminates by making the
deductibility of fertility treatments contingent upon a taxpayer’s gender, sexuality,
and relationship status, though the IRS must rely upon arguments that are at best
inconsistent with—and, at worse, flatly contradict—its previous pronouncements to
effectuate this result. 9
More than simple doctrinal inconsistency is at play here. When Section 213
intersects with fertility treatments, the IRS and the Tax Court must draw the line
between medical and personal expenses, wrestle with notions of what constitutes
the body, and define normal or natural reproduction. Once one recognizes the
hidden value judgments in the doctrine, the IRS’s and Tax Court’s doctrinal
inconsistency is normatively consistent. Under the Code—as presently interpreted
by the IRS and the Tax Court—some persons are proper parents, while others are
not. Some persons’ reproductive decisions are valued and therefore encouraged.
Others’ are not. Thus, the deductibility of fertility treatments under Section 213
ultimately rests on normative judgments about whose reproduction we value and
whom we deem to be proper parents.
Existing scholarship identifies certain inconsistencies between IRS
pronouncements and the outcomes of Sedgwick and Magdalin but offers little

3 Critical Tax Theory scholars tend to approach the Code from this perspective. Despite their
important contributions, however, the powerful majority of tax scholarship does not analyze the Code as
the product of a cultural framework.
4 I.R.C. § 213 (2004).
5 See infra Part I.D.
6 Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008).
7 For a discussion of these inconsistencies as such, see infra Part II.; see also Katherine Pratt,
Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment: Implications of Magdalin v. Commissioner For OppositeSex Couples, Gay and Lesbian Same-Sex Couples, and Single Women and Men, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1283
(2009).
8 Some of the relevant IRS pronouncements occurred after 1994’s Sedgwick. However, I will refer
to pre and post-Sedgwick/Magdalin doctrine. The full force of Sedgwick is best understood when taken
alongside Magdalin. Thus while a pre/post-Sedgwick/Magdalin distinction does not strictly follow
chronology, it is a conceptual distinction which aids the discussion.
9 See Pratt, supra note 7.
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explanation of their origin or significance. 10 This Article aims to fill this gap in the
scholarship by using anthropological theory to identify and discuss the culturally
mediated nature of medicine, the body, and definitions of normalcy.
Anthropological analysis of Section 213 doctrine will show that the value judgment
at the core of the doctrine—that reproduction should occur and be subsidized only
in the context of a heterosexual, married household—was operating pre-Sedgwick
and Magdalin. With this background, it is evident that Sedgwick and Magdalin,
though facially inconsistent, share underlying and unifying value judgments and
assumptions with other IRS pronouncements. As such, by placing Magdalin and
Sedgwick in their cultural context, this Article explains the hidden consistency
beneath the surface inconsistency in Section 213 doctrine.
The aim of this analysis is not simply descriptive, however. The Tax Court
and IRS do not question the assumed objectivity of Section 213’s application to
fertility treatments. But such objectivity is a fiction. The Tax Court and IRS
cannot avoid making value judgments when they struggle to define what is
medical, normal or even what constitutes the body and its normal or natural
capacities. Recognizing the inevitability of value judgments at the intersection of
the body, fertility treatments, and Section 213, this Article aims to construct a
normative framework for reforming current doctrine.
Section 213 doctrine stumbles over various rationales to justify the outcome
with which the IRS and Tax Court are most comfortable—that fertility treatments
be readily deductible for medically infertile, heterosexual, married couples, but not
for anyone else. The end result is a muddled, arbitrary, and discriminatory Section
213 that devalues homosexual and single parenthood. The IRS and Tax Court
should replace their heteronormative, marriage-centric values with ones that
validate new forms of parenthood now enabled by reproductive technologies.
Part I will explore the details of Section 213 doctrine, examining relevant
statutory language, Treasury Regulations, as well as IRS pronouncements and the
limited case law in the area of fertility treatments and Section 213. Part II
introduces the reader to anthropological theory, utilizing it to explain the
underlying value judgments which fuel surface inconsistencies in Section 213
doctrine, thereby exposing those inconsistencies as symptoms of the very existence
of such judgments. Part III proposes significant reforms to reconcile Section 213
doctrine.

10

Id.
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I. REPRODUCTION AND TAXES
A. History and Statutory Text
1. Reproductive Technologies: An Overview
Fertility treatments and reproductive technologies are umbrella terms that
embrace medical interventions into the reproductive process ranging from hormone
therapy to “full” and “gestational surrogacy.” 11 IVF, or in vitro fertilization, is one
of the most common forms of assisted reproductive technologies. 12 IVF involves
joining an egg and sperm—either the patient’s, donor’s, donors’, or a combination
thereof—in a laboratory setting, and implanting the embryo in a woman’s uterus. 13
The costs of fertility treatments—though varying based on the complexity of the
procedures being used and whether a surrogate is involved—make fertility
treatments a ready source of potential deductions under Section 213: the average
cost is $60,000 to achieve live birth. 14 With this general introduction to the world
of reproductive technology, it is now possible to delve into an analysis of Section
213 doctrine.
2. Section 213
Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code, titled “Medical, dental, etc.,
expenses,” creates a deduction for qualifying, unreimbursed medical expenses in
excess of 7.5 percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. 15 Prior to 1942, the
Code did not permit any deductions for medical care expenses, but rather
considered them to be non-deductible personal expenses. 16 Congress’ desire to
encourage taxpayers to seek medical care and to ease the burden of “‘extraordinary
medical expenses’” 17 led it to create the Section 213 deduction. 18 Essentially,
Congress recognized that extraordinary medical expenses “reduce a taxpayer’s
‘ability to pay,’” and therefore should be deductible. 19
The text of Section 213 states in pertinent part:

11 Anna L. Benjamin, The Implications of Using the Medical Expense Deduction of I.R.C. § 213 to
Subsidize Assisted Reproductive Technology, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2004) (quoting
Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 77th Cong. 1612
(1942) (statement of Randolph E. Paul, Tax Advisor to the Sec’y of the Treasury)); see John A.
Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE. W. RES. L. REV.
323, 350 (2004) (defining gestational surrogacy as involving a sperm donor and a separate egg donor and
surrogate, as opposed to “full surrogacy” where the same woman acts as egg donor and surrogate).
12 See Jim Hawkins, Financing Fertility, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115 (2010); Benjamin, supra note
11, at 1119.
13 Benjamin, supra note 11, at 1119.
14 Id. at 1120.
15 I.R.C. § 213 (2005) (note that the floor will increase to 10% for taxable years after 2012).
16 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,832 (Apr. 5, 1972).
17 Benjamin, supra note 11, at 1132.
18 Id.
19 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1289.
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(a) Allowance of deduction.—There shall be allowed as a deduction the
expenses paid during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent . . .
to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross
income . . . .
(d) Definitions.—For the purposes of this section—
(1) The term “medical care” means amounts paid—
(A) for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of
the body. . . . 20

In 1990, Congress created an exemption disallowing a deduction for certain
cosmetic surgery expenses which would normally qualify as procedures affecting
the structure or function of the taxpayer’s body: 21
(9) Cosmetic surgery.—
(A) In general.—The term “medical care” does not include cosmetic
surgery or other similar procedures, unless the surgery or procedure
is necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly
related to, a congenital abnormality, a personal injury resulting from
an accident or trauma, or disfiguring disease.
(B) Cosmetic surgery defined.—For purposes of this paragraph, the
term “cosmetic surgery” means any procedure which is directed at
improving the patient’s appearance and does not meaningfully
promote the proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or
disease. 22

In a recent opinion, Judge Halpern of the Tax Court articulated a framework
for analyzing the deductibility of an expense under Section 213. Recognizing that
Congress created a “series of rules and exceptions” in the code, 23 the IRS begins
with the principle—codified in Section 262—that an individual cannot deduct
personal expenses. 24 Sections 213(a) and (d)(1) create an exception to the general
prohibition of deductibility found in Section 262 for qualifying medical expenses
over 7.5 percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. 25 An expense qualifies if
it meets either condition of the two-prong test created in Section 213(d)(1), i.e., if it
is (i) “for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease”

20 I.R.C. §§ 213(a), 213(d) (2005) (emphasis added). The allowance in subsection (a) of a
deduction for costs incurred by the taxpayer and/or the taxpayer’s spouse and dependents will be
referred to as aggregation. See, e.g., Pratt, supra note 7, at 1320-25.
21 See Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment, 89 CORNELL
L. REV. 1121, 1142-43 (2004) (viewing the amendment to represent a narrowing of the
structure/function prong).
22 I.R.C. § 213(d)(9) (2005).
23 See O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 90 (2010) (Halpern, J., concurring).
24 Id.; see also I.R.C. § 262 (2005).
25 See O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 48.
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(“disease prong”) or (ii) “for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of
the body” 26 (“structure/function prong”).
If an expense seemingly qualifies under the rule created by Section 213(a)
and Section 213(d)(1), the taxpayer must then determine if the expense is subject to
the Section 213(d)(9)(A) exception for cosmetic surgery. 27 All is not lost,
however, for the taxpayer who undergoes cosmetic surgery if his or her surgery
qualifies for the “third order exception [which] restor[es] deductibility” for some
cosmetic surgeries. 28
B. Treasury Regulations and IRS Interpretations
When drafting Section 213, Congress intended the definition of medical care
to be “broadly defined.” 29 But the IRS and the Tax Court have interpreted Section
213 to create a “limited exception” to the non-deductibility of personal expenses,
specifically in the area of fertility treatments. 30 Primary tax law sources, including
Treasury Regulations, Tax Court decisions, IRS Revenue Rulings, Private Letter
Rulings, General Counsel Memoranda, and Information Letters provide a complete
picture of what constitutes qualifying medical care. Although each of these sources
has different precedential value, their importance for this inquiry lays in
demonstrating the IRS’s and Tax Court’s operating value judgments and
assumptions regarding the body and what is medical and normal in the fertility
context.
1. Treasury Regulation 1.213-1
Any analysis of the coverage of fertility treatments under Section 213 must
begin with Treasury Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1). Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1) elaborates
upon the meaning of medical care, reading, in pertinent part:
(e) Definitions—(1) General. (i) The term medical care includes the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease. Expenses
paid for “medical care” shall include those paid for the purpose of affecting
any structure or function of the body or for transportation primarily for and
essential to medical care.
(ii) Amounts paid for operations or treatments affecting any portion of the
body, including obstetrical expenses and expenses of therapy or X-ray
treatments, are deemed to be for the purpose of affecting any structure or
function of the body and are therefore paid for medical care . . . .

26

I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2005).
See O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 90.
28 Id.
29 S. REP. NO. 1631-77 (1942).
30 See, e.g., Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491, *2 (citing Jacobs v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.
813, 818 (1974)). For a discussion of the relationship between the IRS, Treasury, Congress and the
courts in creating and interpreting tax law, see Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme
Court?, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 185 (2004).
27
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Deductions for expenditures for medical care allowable under section 213
will be confined strictly to expenses incurred primarily for the prevention
or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness. Thus, payments for
the following are payments for medical care: hospital services, nursing
services (including nurses’ board where paid by the taxpayer), medical,
laboratory, surgical, dental and other diagnostic and healing services, Xrays, medicine and drugs . . . . However, an expenditure which is merely
beneficial to the general health of an individual, such as an expenditure for
a vacation, is not an expenditure for medical care. 31

The meaning of this provision is hotly contested territory not only in the debate
regarding the deductibility of fertility treatments, but also the deductibility of other
procedures and care under Section 213. 32 As we shall see, implementation of
Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1) in the area of fertility treatments has been inconsistent at
best.
2. IRS Interpretive Opinions
Over the past forty years, the IRS has issued a number of opinions in various
forms regarding the deductibility of fertility and reproductive medical expenses. A
review of these sources provides a comprehensive view of the IRS’s understanding
of the applicability of Section 213 to such expenses. Further, such review shows
how, over time, the IRS’s standpoint on the deductibility of certain expenses shifts,
hinting at the ever-evolving nature of what constitutes medical care—a concept
which will be explored on a theoretical level in Part II. Lastly, a review of these
pronouncements lays the groundwork for showing how the inconsistencies of
Section 213 doctrine reveal hidden IRS and Tax Court value judgments and
assumptions regarding reproduction and family structure.
i. IRS Publication 502
IRS Publication 502, “Medical and Dental Expenses,” synthesizes previous
IRS statements regarding the deductibility of an expense to aid taxpayers in
completing their tax returns. 33 Among others allowances, Publication 502
expressly provides for the deductibility of medical expenses for abortions, birth
control pills, pregnancy tests, sterilization, and vasectomies. 34 Regarding “fertility
enhancement” expenses specifically, Publication 502 provides that “the cost of the
following procedures to overcome an inability to have children” are deductible:
(1) “[p]rocedures such as in vitro fertilization (including temporary storage
of eggs or sperm)”; and

31

Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii)&(ii) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 90 (providing an extended discussion of Treas. Reg. §
1.213-1(e)(1) and its impact on the deductibility of treatment for gender identity disorder).
33 See I.R.S. Publ’n 502 (Dec. 9, 2008).
34 Id.
32
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(2) “[s]urgery, including an operation to reverse prior surgery that
prevented the person operated on from having children.” 35

Although the publication reiterates the provision of Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii),
which states that “[m]edical care expenses must be primarily to alleviate or prevent
a physical or mental defect or illness,” 36 it does not restrict the deductibility of
fertility treatment to costs expended to address a specific disease or organic
etiology. Rather, it simply states that a taxpayer may deduct the costs of fertility
treatments or surgery whose purpose is “to overcome an inability to have
children.” 37 The unqualified nature of this statement is critical to an analysis of
inconsistent positions taken by the IRS and the Tax Court.
ii. Revenue Rulings
Although Publication 502 clearly states that the cost of birth control is a
deductible medical care expense regardless of the taxpayer’s reason for using birth
control, this was not always the case. 38 Revenue Ruling 67-339, issued in 1967,
limited the deduction of the cost of birth control only in “circumstances [where] in
the opinion of the physician[,] the possibility of childbirth raises a serious threat to
the life of the wife.” 39 According to the Chief Counsel of the IRS, a woman who
could not safely carry a baby to term was “clearly [suffering from] a physical defect
or illness.” 40 The Chief Counsel specifically cautioned against the expansion of
the deduction to encompass the costs of birth control when a woman simply wanted
to prevent pregnancy but could safely carry a child; 41 i.e., truly elective use of birth
control. A mere six years later, however, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 73-200,
which recognized the deductibility of the cost of birth control, regardless of the
taxpayer’s motivation in using it. 42 Whereas the IRS previously felt that truly
elective birth control was non-deductible medical care, with passage of time,
shifting public opinion on sexuality, and the continued evolution of medical
knowledge, the agency revised its conception to recognize the deductibility of such
expenses.
The IRS built upon this shift in subsequent opinions, further expanding its
concept of what constitutes deductible reproductive medical care under Section
213. Also in 1973, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 73-201, which held that
vasectomies and elective abortions qualify as medical care. 43 Both operations, the
35

Id.
Id.
37 Id.
38 I.R.S. Publ’n 502 (Dec. 9, 2008); see also Rev. Rul. 67-339, 1967-2 C.B. 126.
39 Rev. Rul. 67-339, 1967-2 C.B. 126.
40 Frederick R. Parker, Jr., Federal Income Tax Policy and Abortion in the United States, 13 MICH.
ST. U. J. MED. & L. 335, 342 (2009) (alteration in original).
41 Id.
42 Rev. Rul. 73-200, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (“[T]he amount expended for the birth control pills is an
amount paid for medical care.”).
43 Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140.
36
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IRS reasoned, satisfy the structure/function prong of the Section 213 medical care
definition. 44 Importantly, the IRS stated that both operations satisfied the
requirement of Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) that allowable expenditures be
“primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or
illness,” 45 regardless of the fact that the procedures did not address an underlying
disease or condition. The IRS strengthened this stance in Revenue Ruling 73-603,
stating that a woman may deduct the cost of any procedure “render[ing] her
incapable of having children,” whether elective or not, as such a procedure falls
under the structure/function prong. 46 Thus, if the procedure satisfies the
structure/function prong, the taxpayer’s motivation in pursuing a procedure is
immaterial, as is whether the procedure treats an underlying condition.
iii. General Counsel Memoranda
Where the Revenue Rulings themselves are sparing in discussion, a 1972 IRS
General Counsel Memorandum elaborates on the principles supporting deduction
of costs for vasectomies, elective abortion, and surgeries to prevent conception.
Importantly, the memorandum addressed the scope of Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii),
which states that allowable expenditures must be “primarily for the prevention or
alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness.” 47 More specifically, the
memorandum reasons that Regulation 1.213-1
cannot be given a broad interpretation without conflicting with other parts
of the regulations. This is so because the regulations specifically allow a
deduction for obstetrical expenses (generally not related to any physical or
mental defect or illness) and because the fourth sentence of section 1.2131(e)(1)(ii) . . . concludes from statements made in the first three sentences,
that payments for medical and surgical services (among others) are
payments for medical care.
Accordingly, we conclude that the [primarily for . . . provision] . . . was not
intended to and does not, apply to any medical expenses otherwise meeting
the statutory definition of medical care, such as amounts paid for legal
surgical operations, since those operations affect a structure or function of
the body. 48
44

Id.
Id. (“Since the purpose of the [vasectomy] is to effect both a structure and a function of the body,
its cost is an amount paid for medical care as defined in section 213(e) of the Code and section 1.2131(e)(1)(ii) of the regulations.”). With respect to an abortion, the ruling concluded that “[s]ince the
operation . . . is deemed to be for the purpose of affecting a structure or a function paid the body, its cost
is an amount paid for medical care as defined in section 213(e) of the Code and section 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii)
of the regulations.” Id.
46 Rev. Rul. 73-603, 1973-2 C.B. 76 (“[A] taxpayer’s expenditures for an operation . . . at her own
request to [be sterilized] are deemed to be for the purpose of affecting a structure or function of the
body, and therefore, are amounts paid for medical care.”).
47 Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140.
48 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,832 (Apr. 5, 1972) (first emphasis added).
45
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In support of this principle, the memorandum favorably quotes an earlier tax
court case in which the court evaluated the regulation. The opinion read as follows:
“[c]learly the word ‘primarily’ [in the ‘primarily for’ provision of Regulation
1.213-1(e)(1)(ii)] was used with reference to those types of expenditure which by
their nature have no more than a remote or general relationship to health . . . . A
bill for physician’s services rendered for any of the enumerated statutory purposes
is not such.” 49 Revenue Rulings 73-201 and 73-603 adopted this principle, holding
that procedures that satisfy the structure/function prong satisfy Regulation 1.2131(e)(1)(ii). 50 Taken alongside these revenue rulings, this General Counsel
Memorandum instructs us that the primarily for provision of Regulation 1.2131(e)(1)(ii) cannot apply to expenses which (a) qualify under the structure/function
prong, (b) are not otherwise excluded by the cosmetic surgery exemption, and or
(c) are paid for expressly medical expenses. 51
The IRS’s subsequent pronouncement in Revenue Ruling 2007-72 rests on
the same logic as the General Counsel Memorandum. In Revenue Ruling 2007-72,
the IRS stated that the cost of a pregnancy test qualifies as a deductible medical
care expense. 52 In holding the test to be deductible, Revenue Ruling 2007-72 first
emphasized that, per Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii), “obstetrical services” are deemed
to be deductible medical care that satisfies the structure/function prong of Section
213, hinting that a pregnancy test could qualify as obstetrical care under that
prong. 53 After all, a pregnancy test does not treat or diagnose a disease, and,
therefore, the disease prong seems unavailable. Nevertheless, the IRS held that a
test which evaluates “changes in the functions of the body . . . that are unrelated to
disease” qualifies as deductible care, “even though its purpose is to test the healthy
functioning . . . rather than detect disease[,]” a position which seems to ground
deductibility in the disease prong despite the absence of any disease to treat or
diagnose. 54 This outcome clarifies that when the IRS faces medical care which
appears to it to be expressly medical, it does not require the presence of underlying
disease as a prerequisite to deductibility under Section 213 and that it views
reproductive care as a fully medicalized field. 55

49

I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,832 (Apr. 5, 1972) (quoting Starrett v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 877, 822

(1964).
50

See Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140; Rev. Rul. 73-603, 1973-2 C.B. 76.
See IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,832 (Apr. 5, 1972); see also O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C.
34 (2010)(Holmes, J. concurring).
52 Rev. Rul. 2007-72, 2007-50 I.R.B. 1154.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 See discussion infra Part II. For our immediate purpose, however, it simply means that fertility
and reproductive care are readily identified as medical care.
51
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iv. Letter Rulings and Interpretations
Though all of the aforementioned IRS pronouncements address reproductive
care, they do not—excluding Publication 502—specifically discuss fertility
treatments. In recent years, however, the IRS issued two important letters
evaluating the deductibility of fertility expenses. Each letter expressly identified
certain fertility treatments as qualifying medical expenses with little limitation.
In 2003, the IRS issued a private letter ruling permitting a taxpayer who had
undergone significant, unsuccessful fertility treatments to deduct the costs of egg
donation, including the donor’s expenses. 56 In order to reach its ultimate
conclusion that the procedure was deductible, the agency drew upon the revenue
rulings that held that vasectomy and sterilization costs are deductible as procedures
that affect a structure or function of the body. 57 Recognizing egg donation as a
“procedure [whose] purpose [is to] facilitat[e] pregnancy by overcoming
infertility[,]” the IRS reasoned that the procedure “affects a structure or function of
the body” and therefore similarly satisfies the structure/function prong of Section
213. 58 The IRS also analogized the deductibility of the donor’s expenses to the
deductibility of a kidney donor’s expenses by the donee. 59 The IRS later faced but
refused to recognize this analogy in the Magdalin case, an inconsistency which will
be subsequently addressed. 60
In 2005, the IRS once again took up the issue of the deductibility of egg
donor fees and again it found such fees to be deductible as medical expenses under
Section 213. 61 As its rationale, the IRS noted that “[f]ertility is a function of the
body” and the costs of fertility treatments aimed at “overcom[ing] infertility”
satisfy Section 213. 62 Specifically, the costs of egg or embryo donation to be
implanted in the taxpayer’s body qualify as “medical care of the taxpayer.” 63 The
IRS drew upon the kidney donor analogy once again, demonstrating the strength of
this analogy in the mind of the IRS. 64 The IRS touched upon the issue of whether
fertility is a function of all bodies in Magdalin, where it took a narrower view than
that of the plain meaning of the language used herein. 65

56

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-18-017 (May 2, 2003).
Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. (“[E]xpenses the taxpayer pays to obtain an egg donor, including the donor’s expenses, are
directly related and preparatory to the taxpayer’s receiving the donated egg or embryo. The expenses
are therefore the taxpayer’s medical expenses and are deductible by the taxpayer in the year paid.”).
60 See Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008).
61 I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2005-0102 (Mar. 29, 2005).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008).
57
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***
In sum, from its pronouncements on fertility treatments, it is clear that the
IRS:
(1) recognizes fertility as a function of the body; 66
(2) views treatments aimed at overcoming an inability to have children as
qualifying medical expenses; 67 and
(3) does not require that an underlying disease be present for medical
treatment to qualify as deductible—e.g., vasectomies, birth control, and
abortion costs. 68

These pronouncements do not qualify the deductibility of care based on a person’s
gender, marital status, or sexuality. However, Sedgwick v. Commissioner and
Magdalin v. Commissioner addressed reproductive care on the margins—a
heterosexual couple utilizing surrogacy and a gay man having children through a
combination of IVF and surrogacy. 69 These cases exhibit inconsistencies with the
pronouncements that illuminate the IRS’s and Tax Court’s long-concealed value
judgments regarding the body, the line between medical and personal, what
constitutes normal reproduction and ultimately, who makes a proper parent.
C. Case Law on the Deductibility of Fertility Treatments
There is limited case law on the deductibility of fertility treatments under
Section 213. But the two key cases—Sedgwick v. Commissioner and Magdalin v.
Commissioner—reveal puzzling inconsistencies. Indeed, the cases suggest a
significant narrowing of the scope of deductible fertility treatments when compared
with the doctrine discussed above. 70 But these surface inconsistencies can be
explained by a deep consistency. This Article proposes that Sedgwick and
Magdalin, properly understood, reveal the assumptions with which the IRS and the
Tax Court have always operated in applying Section 213 to fertility treatments.
1. Sedgwick v. Commissioner
Sedgwick v. Commissioner addressed the issue of the deductibility of
surrogacy costs for an infertile heterosexual couple. 71 Although the case settled

66

I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2005-0102 (Mar. 29, 2005).
See I.R.S. Publ’n 502 (Dec. 9, 2008); IRS Info. Ltr. 2005-0102 (Mar. 29, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul., 2003-18-017 (May 2, 2003).
68 See I.R.S. Publ’n 502 (Dec. 9, 2008); Rev. Rul. 2007-72, 2007-50 I.R.B. 1154; Rev. Rul. 73-603,
1973-2 C.B. 76; Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140; Rev. Rul. 73-200, 1973-1 C.B. 140; I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 34,832 (Apr. 5, 1972).
69 See Sedgwick v. Comm’r, No. 10133-94, LEXSTAT 94 PTT 13-53 (T.C. filed June 14, 1994);
Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008).
70 See infra Part I.D.
71 Sedgwick v. Comm’r, No. 10133-94, LEXSTAT 94 PTT 13-53 (T.C. filed June 14, 1994). The
case, which resulted in a settlement, is discussed in Pratt, supra note 7, at 8-9, from which this summary
is taken.
67
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without an opinion in favor of the taxpayer, the IRS argued and continues to argue
that surrogacy expenses do not qualify as medical expenses under Section 213. 72
Notably, Magdalin v. Commissioner, discussed below, punts on the issue, refusing
to discuss whether surrogacy costs would be deductible for persons the court views
as infertile. 73 In Sedgwick, the IRS argued that surrogacy is “elective” and bears
only on the taxpayer’s “general mental health,” making it a non-deductible personal
expense per Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii). 74 As explained further below, this stance
flatly contradicts the existing Section 213 doctrine discussed above. 75
2. Magdalin v. Commissioner
The Tax Court decided Magdalin v. Commissioner in 2008, the First Circuit
upheld the Tax Court ruling, 76 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 77 Thus,
Magdalin stands as the authoritative pronouncement in this area.
Taxpayer William Magdalin was a gay man who used gestational surrogates
and IVF to have two children. 78 The Tax Court denied deductions for Magdalin’s
surrogacy and IVF expenses, concluding that Magdalin “cannot deduct those
expenses because he has no medical condition or defect to which those expenses
relate and because they did not affect a structure or function of his body.” 79 The
First Circuit affirmed on that basis, noting that Magdalin “stipulated that he was not
infertile and that his previous children had been produced by natural processes.” 80
Accordingly, the court reasoned, the surrogacy and IVF expenses “were not for the
treatment of any underlying medical condition suffered by the taxpayer” and
therein failed under the disease prong. 81 Because the procedures, in the court’s
view, affected only the structure or function of the surrogates’ bodies, Magdalin’s
claim failed under the second, structure/function prong of Section 213 as well. 82
Most importantly, the court apparently adopted the IRS’s argument that an
underlying disease is a precursor even to the deductibility of care that satisfies the
structure/function prong. 83

72

Pratt, supra note 7, at 1303.
See Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008) (stating that because Magdalin was not
medically infertile, “[w]e therefore need not answer lurking questions as to whether (and, if so, to what
extent) expenditures for IVF procedures and associated costs . . . would be deductible in the presence of
an underlying medical condition.”).
74 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1303.
75 Id. at 1330-34; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1979).
76 Magdalin, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491.
77 Magdalin v. Comm’r. 130 S. Ct. 2388 (2010).
78 Magdalin, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491.
79 Id.
80 Magdalin v. Comm’r, 2009 WL 5557509 (1st Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See Magdalin, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491; see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 1311, 1325.
73
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With this background, this Article now turns to the inconsistencies in Section
213 doctrine as exemplified by Sedgwick and Magdalin and revealed by
examination of the IRS’s divergent pronouncements.
II. POWER AND DIFFERENCE IN REPRODUCTION
Consider for a moment the following hypothetical. A heterosexual married
couple is medically fertile, but both partners carry the Tay-Sachs gene, which can
result in Tay-Sachs disease, a genetic disorder that results in physical and mental
deterioration and early death. Although neither parent suffers from the disease, if
they have a child, that child has a 25% chance of suffering from Tay-Sachs and a
50% chance of being a genetic carrier. 84 The couple seeks out egg and sperm
donors who are not carriers and the wife undergoes IVF to be implanted with an
embryo. Utilizing these technologies provides the only means, other than adoption,
for this couple to guarantee that their child does not suffer from Tay-Sachs. 85
Could the couple deduct the costs of the donors and IVF?
Tracking the intuitive response to this question, it is clear that under the preSedgwick/Magdalin doctrine, the hypothetical couple would be entitled to a
deduction for at least the IVF procedure, the most expensive aspect of their
treatment. This is the case because, under the pre-Sedgwick/Magdalin framework,
there is no disease requirement for the structure/function prong. But the couple
would not be entitled to a deduction following Sedgwick and Magdalin. The IVF
procedures do not satisfy the Magdalin disease requirement, as the couple is
medically fertile. 86 To view the fertility expenses as mitigation or treatment of
their unexpressed genetic condition reads the disease prong uncharacteristically
broadly. Thus the couple’s expenses fail under the first prong of Section 213.
Although the procedures affect the structure of the wife’s body, the treatments still
should not be deductible under the second, structure/function prong because
Magdalin makes an underlying disease a precursor to the deductibility of treatment
under either prong. 87
What explains this inconsistency between the pre and postSedgwick/Magdalin doctrine? This Part argues that the IRS and the Tax Court are
operating with a heteronormative, marriage-centric understanding of natural or
normal reproduction, what qualifies as medical, and who makes an appropriate
parent. This set of norms drove the IRS and the Tax Court to conclude in Magdalin
that a deduction was not permissible—not because of any command in the doctrine,
but rather because the taxpayer in that case did not fit the IRS’s and the Tax

84 Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst., Learning About Tay Sachs Disease, NAT’L INST. OF
HEALTH & LEARNING, http://www.genome.gov/10001220 (June 28, 2010).
85 Id.
86 See Magdalin, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491; see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 25.
87 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1325.
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Court’s understanding of who a proper parent is. Thus, Magdalin represents a
break in the doctrine that reveals an underlying reproduction of value.
With the help of Professor Katherine Pratt’s existing scholarship on the issue,
the following discussion systematically evaluates and reveals the inconsistencies
and inequalities of post-Sedgwick/Magdalin Section 213 doctrine based on an
individual’s relationship status, gender and sexuality. Part II.A applies that
doctrine based on each of those facts. Part II.B discusses the inconsistencies that
are revealed in Part II.A. And Part III.C considers those surface inconsistencies
through the lens of culture and history, showing the consistent normative
commitments that explain the disarray in the doctrine.
A. Applications of Post-Sedgwick/Magdalin Doctrine
This Section begins by examining the inconsistencies in existing doctrine
when viewed through the lens of relationship status, gender, and sexuality.
1. Heterosexual Couples
Section 213 doctrine places the fewest restraints on a heterosexual couple
attempting to deduct the costs of fertility treatment. A medically infertile, 88
heterosexual, married couple can deduct any fertility treatments, excluding
surrogacy costs, without incident and regardless of which individual is the cause of
the medical-infertility—including even the costs of procedures such as sperm
collection for a medically fertile man for IVF treatment. 89 Indeed, such a couple
can deduct the costs even when physicians cannot identify an organic etiology for
the infertility. 90 Sedgwick and Magdalin leave uncertain whether a medically
infertile heterosexual, married couple may deduct surrogacy costs. 91 However, if
the couple can demonstrate medical infertility, all surrogacy costs, including egg
and or sperm donation, should be deductible under the rationale that, like a kidney
donor, the surrogate provides a substitute for normal functioning of the
reproductive systems of the couple. 92 Surrogacy so viewed should satisfy the first
prong of Section 213 as treatment for disease. 93 Nevertheless, the IRS took the
opposite position in Sedgwick and the Tax Court refused to address the question in

88 See discussion infra Parts II.-III. For its current purpose, it means infertility traceable to an
organic etiology, as opposed to a person’s sexuality or relationship status. See Pratt, supra note 7, at
1286.
89 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1320-24.
90 Id. at 1321. This reality undermines the argument in Magdalin that an underlying disease is a
precursor to deductibility under either prong. Instead it supports a definition of infertility defined by the
end result—inability to have a child—regardless of the cause of that result. See discussion infra Part III.
91 Id. at 1320-22.
92 Id. at 1322-24.
93 Id. at 1304-05.
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Magdalin, thereby perpetuating a disjunct between the logical conclusion of
existing doctrine and actual outcomes for individual taxpayers. 94
Although a medically infertile, married, heterosexual couple can easily take
advantage of Section 213 for a wide range of fertility treatments, re-envision that
couple as unmarried, and the situation becomes more complicated. 95 The first
hurdle such a couple faces is establishing proof of infertility. 96 Existing definitions
of infertility and the aggregation permitted under Section 213 remove the need for a
married couple to show proof of infertility—other than the inability to conceive or
carry a baby to term without assistance—or to determine which spouse is
infertile. 97 An unmarried couple, however, cannot file jointly or take advantage of
Section 213’s permitted aggregation of the taxpayer’s body with that of his or her
spouse and dependents. 98 This reality creates the need for the taxpayer to
demonstrate his or her medical infertility over and above his or her inability to have
a child, a challenge not faced by a similar couple who is married and one which
limits the scope of treatments deductible to an unmarried couple. 99
Recall that, for tax purposes, each partner in an unmarried heterosexual
couple is treated as being single. 100 This tax treatment mirrors that of a person
who is actually single, as well as gay and lesbian individuals even if they are in a
relationship or legally married under state law. 101 If a man is infertile, he can
deduct the costs of treatment for his infertility. 102 If his girlfriend undergoes
artificial insemination or IVF for which the man pays the costs, he should be able
to deduct those costs as treatment of his infertility under the first prong of Section

94

See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1320-24; see also Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008).
There are no published opinions or IRS pronouncements addressing the deductibility of fertility
treatments for an unmarried, heterosexual, medically-infertile couple.
96 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1322-23.
97 Id. at 1320-24.
98 Id.; I.R.C. § 213(a) (2004) (limiting aggregation to spouse and dependents).
99 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1320-24.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1311-12 (noting that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) forces all homosexual couples
to file separately as it “prohibits federal recognition of same-sex marriages”). Importantly, in May 2012
the First Circuit Court of Appeals found DOMA to be unconstitutional. See Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[T]he rationales offered do not provide
adequate support for section 3 of DOMA.”). Likewise, in October 2012, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals also declared DOMA unconstitutional. See Windsor v. U.S., 2012 WL 4937310 (2d Cir. 2012).
Further, the Obama Administration has officially stated that it will no longer argue in support of the
constitutionality of the Act and has pressured the Supreme Court for speedy review of lower court
rulings finding DOMA unconstitutional. See, e.g., DOMA Appeal: Obama Administration Asks
Supreme Court for Quick Review of Gay Marriage Law, HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 3, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/03/doma-appeal-supreme-court-gaymarriage_n_1648119.html; Obama: DOMA Unconstitutional, DOJ Should Stop Defending in Court,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/23/obama-domaunconstitutional_n_827134.html.
The outcome of a potential Supreme Court ruling on the
constitutionality of DOMA could have far-reaching implications, perhaps opening the door to jointfiling for same-sex couples.
102 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1323.
95
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213. 103 If the woman paid her own costs, however, she could not deduct the
expenses, post-Magdalin. 104 Although the expenses should qualify under the
structure/function prong, the Magdalin disease requirement would preclude the
deduction nevertheless, because the woman is medically fertile and therein does not
suffer from an underlying disease. 105 The reverse of this situation also holds. 106
In comparison, either party of a married couple or the couple filing jointly could
deduct all of the costs above because Section 213 permits aggregation of the body
of the taxpayer and his or her spouse, 107 a result which reflects the IRS’s and Tax
Court’s bias in favor of marriage. However, even this couple is, on balance, in a
better position under Section 213 than are medically fertile singles or homosexual
couples.
2. Lesbian Couples and Single Women
Assuming these women do not want to engage in sexual relations with men
simply to have children, 108 a lesbian couple, or a single woman, even if medically
fertile, clearly cannot have a child without at least some medical intervention. 109
But which of their reproductive technology expenses will be deductible, if any? If
one partner or a single woman is medically infertile, the costs of diagnosing and
treating medical infertility, such as IVF, are likely deductible expenses for that
taxpayer. 110 However, the couple will run into resistance in deducting the costs of
sperm donation, as the “woman’s body, whether fertile or infertile, can never
supply sperm.” 111 This fact allows the IRS or the Tax Court to determine that the
cost of sperm donation does not treat a disease or malfunction of the taxpayer’s
body. 112 Recall that such costs are, however, deductible to a heterosexual married
couple, who do not have to trace infertility to either partner. 113 Nevertheless, a
lesbian couple or single woman who is medically infertile is in a distinctly better
position than when the couple or woman is medically fertile.

103

Id. at 1323-24.
Id. at 1323-24, 1346 (arguing that a woman should be able to deduct such expenses under the
structure/function prong, but ultimately recognizing that Magdalin prohibits this deduction).
105 Id.
106 See id. at 1322-24 (claiming that where a couple’s infertility is attributable to the woman, she can
deduct the costs of treatments to mitigate her infertility, but her boyfriend cannot).
107 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1320-24, 1346.
108 No person, whether heterosexual or homosexual, should be pushed to engage in an undesired
sexual relationship simply to have children. Magdalin rightly argued that by denying deductibility of
fertility treatments and perpetuating a heteronormative conception of reproduction, the Tax Court and
IRS were encouraging such behavior. Id. at 1335 (citing Petitioner’s Reply Brief). Such relationships
are both “unstable” and blatantly disregard that to do so may run counter to a person’s sexuality and
morality. Id.
109 Id. at 1287-88.
110 Id. at 1320-24.
111 Id. at 1324.
112 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1324.
113 Id. at 1320-21, 1330.
104
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Post-Magdalin, a medically fertile lesbian couple or single woman will face
significant challenges in attempting to deduct the costs of fertility treatments. As
previously discussed, Magdalin attempts to make underlying medical infertility a
prerequisite for deducting even fertility treatment expenses which satisfy the
structure/function prong. 114 Therefore, a medically fertile lesbian couple or single
woman could be excluded from deducting the costs of all fertility treatments—not
just sperm donation—because the infertility is “not attributable to medical
infertility [but rather] . . . dysfertility that is a result of [the couple’s] sexual
orientation.” 115 Post-Magdalin, in the absence of demonstrated medical infertility,
medically fertile single women or lesbian couples seeking to use fertility treatments
to have a child will likely be precluded from deducting those costs. 116
3. Gay Couple or Single Man
Biological realities command that, short of engaging in a sexual relationship
with a woman only to have a child, a single man or gay couple must rely upon egg
donation and surrogacy to have a child. 117 Any man, regardless of his sexuality or
marital status, can deduct the costs of testing for and treatment of his medical
infertility. 118 The problem arises when a man is medically fertile and seeks to
utilize egg donation and surrogacy in order to have a child. 119 Magdalin
unequivocally states that a medically fertile man cannot deduct the costs of egg
donation or surrogacy because (i) he does not suffer from medical infertility—
thereby precluding deductibility under the disease prong—and (ii) because the
treatments affect the structure or function of a third party—thereby precluding
deductibility under the structure/function prong. 120 Although the taxpayer in
Magdalin was homosexual, the holding of the case applies with equal force to any
medically fertile man, be he single or a partner in a gay couple. 121 Thus, current
Section 213 doctrine heavily burdens men, making medically fertile single men or
gay couples responsible for the full costs of fertility treatments. 122
Operating with a working knowledge of the effects of postSedgwick/Magdalin Section 213 doctrine, it is now time to ask whether these
outcomes are appropriate. Are the IRS and Tax Court consistently applying a
unified set of principles regarding the intersection of Section 213 doctrine, the
body, and fertility treatments, which just happens to result in discrimination based
on a person’s gender, sexuality or marital status?
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id. at 1321-22.
Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1325-31; see also infra note 101.
Id. at 1287-89.
Pratt, supra note 7, at 1320-31.
Id. at 1324-27.
Id. at 1330-34.
Id. at 1339-40.
Id.
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B. Four Inconsistencies in Section 213 Doctrine
As will be discussed below, Section 213 doctrine currently displays four
seeming inconsistencies which result in the inequitable outcomes identified in Part
II.A.
1. Inconsistent Aggregation of the Body
As Professor Pratt has discussed, the Tax Court and the IRS inconsistently
aggregate the body of the taxpayer and others receiving medical care.123
Aggregation refers to the expansion of the term “of the body” in Section 213 to
allow the taxpayer to deduct expenses for medical care of persons other than
taxpayer. 124 Section 213 explicitly permits the aggregation of the taxpayer’s body
with that of his or her spouse and dependents, thereby making the costs of all
fertility treatments of a heterosexual, married couple deductible to either spouse. 125
Expanding aggregation beyond Section 213’s explicit language, the IRS and the
Tax Court permit a married, heterosexual couple to aggregate their bodies with an
egg and or sperm donor’s body, allowing the couple to deduct the donor’s costs. 126
Yet that aggregation is cut off when the taxpayer is medically fertile but requires
reproductive technologies to have a child because of his or her sexuality or marital
status. 127
2. Failure to Consistently Recognize Fertility as a Function of All Bodies
The IRS specifically identified fertility as a function of the body, yet postSedgwick/Magdalin doctrine fails to recognize fertility as a function of all
bodies. 128 If fertility is a recognized function of the body, there is no necessary
reason that it is less so based on a person’s gender, sexuality, or relationship status.
Nevertheless, in Magdalin, the IRS argued that reproduction is not a function of the
male body. 129 As Pratt notes, this argument is “preposterous,” as no person, male
or female, can reproduce without the genetic material of the other gender. 130 The
fact that a woman bears a greater burden in human reproduction does not make
reproduction a function of her body more than a man’s body. 131 Furthermore, the
aforementioned IRS Information Letter on the issue made no distinction based on

123

Id. at 1311-32.
Id.
125 I.R.C. § 213(a) (2004); Pratt, supra note 7, at 1312-13, 1321-22.
126 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1338.
127 Id. at 1338-39.
128 I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2005-0102 (Mar. 29, 2005).
129 Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008); see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 1323.
130 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1332.
131 Id.; see also Sherry Ortner, Is Female to Male As Nature is to Culture?, in WOMEN, CULTURE,
AND SOCIETY (M.Z. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere eds., 1974).
124
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gender in its statement that fertility is a function of the body. 132 Thus, the IRS/Tax
Court’s position in Magdalin contradicts its previous statements. 133
3. Inconsistent Application of the “Substitute for Normal Functioning” Doctrine
Professor Pratt identifies that the IRS and the Tax Court have articulated a
“substitute for normal functioning” doctrine regarding the deductibility of medical
expenses. 134 Evolving out of the realm of rulings on the deductibility of organ
donor expenses by the donee taxpayer, the principle is simple: when a donee
taxpayer pays the medical expenses of his or her donor, those expenses are
deductible as treatment for the taxpayer’s disease or condition. 135 When a
procedure or expense provides a substitute for normal functioning, it may satisfy
either prong of Section 213. 136 The fact that the expenses were incurred for
treatment of a body other than the taxpayer’s is immaterial, as the Tax Court
permits aggregation of his or her body with that of the donor. 137 Extending such
arguments to the deductibility of fertility treatments, surrogacy costs for a
medically infertile woman should be easily deductible, yet the IRS has challenged
the deductibility of such expenses. 138 Further, surrogacy with egg donation for
men or sperm donation with AI or IVF for women represent the best and only
means of effectuating the normal functioning of a single or homosexual person’s
reproductive system. 139 Nevertheless, despite frequent analogies between kidneydonor rulings and fertility treatments in past pronouncements, in Magdalin and
Sedgwick, the court and the IRS severed that relationship, again creating
inconsistency in Section 213 doctrine.
4. Inconsistent Requirement of the Presence of Disease
Perhaps the IRS’s and the Tax Court’s most glaring inconsistency—and the
one most detrimental to medically fertile single persons and homosexual couples—
is their inconsistency in requiring the presence of disease as a precursor to
deductibility of fertility treatments. In the absence of such medical infertility, the
IRS views these fertility procedures as non-deductible personal choices. 140 The
IRS goes so far as to state that because Magdalin could have children “‘naturally’
132

I.R.S. Info. Ltr., 2005-0102 (Mar. 29, 2005).
Pratt, supra note 7, at 1330-32.
134 Id. at 1297-98, 1306-1308.
135 Id. at 1297-98.
136 Id. (noting that kidney donor expenses both qualify for deductibility as treatment for a disease
(first prong) and result in procedures which affect the structure of the donor’s body (second prong),
compared with a deduction for a seeing-eye dog which acts as a substitute for normal functioning but is
deductible under only under the first prong).
137 Id. at 1297-98.
138 Id. at 1305-06.
139 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1321-30, 1335-37.
140 Magdalin v. Comm’r, 2009 WL 5557509 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 1334-35
(citing respondent’s argument).
133
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or ‘normally’ [as he had with his previous wife,] he chose not to,” thereby reifying
the perception of his expenses as non-deductible personal expenses. 141 Such a
medical/personal distinction casts reproduction by medically fertile single persons
or homosexual couples as akin to a personal expense, such as a vacation, which
only generally benefits the health of the taxpayer. 142
Requiring disease as a precursor to deductibility for medical expenses that
satisfy the structure/function prong fails as a valid requirement in three ways. 143
First, the requirement completely disregards that Section 213 is written in the
disjunctive, permitting deductions of expenses “for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or
function of the body . . . .” 144 Second, it ignores that the IRS and the Tax Court
already allow deductions as medical care for birth control, vasectomy, and
sterilization expenses without the presence of an underlying disease. 145 Third and
last, it ignores that Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1) expressly states that costs for
“obstetrical expenses . . . are deemed to be for the purpose of affecting any
structure or function of the body and are therefore paid for medical care[.]” Such
expenses are inherently medical, and the nature of these expenses should not
change based upon the sexuality, gender or relationship status of those who pay
them. 146 But if the IRS and Tax Court cannot rely on the rest of Section 213
doctrine to support the Magdalin disease requirement, where did they look to create
such an inconsistent requirement?
***
Recognizing the seeming inconsistencies between the arguments in Sedgwick
and Magdalin and the IRS’s various positions on the deductibility of fertility
treatments, what can we make of these inconsistencies? When faced with the
concepts of surrogacy, single, or gay and lesbian reproduction—concepts which
challenge notions of kinship and the reproductive process 147—the IRS and the Tax
Court seemed to narrow their conceptualization of medical care. The question
which naturally arises is: why this sudden rigidity?
At points, existing scholarship comes tantalizingly close to discussing some
of these broader questions. Professor Pratt recognizes that Section 213 doctrine has
something to say about the IRS’s and Tax Court’s conceptualization of the

141

Pratt, supra note 7, at 1334 (citing respondent’s argument).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1979); see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 1303-04 (discussing
how by making surrogacy appear to be a personal choice, rather than medical care, Sedgwick equated
reproduction with a vacation).
143 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1330-32.
144 I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2004) (emphasis added); See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1330.
145 See infra Part III.B.; see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 1330-32.
146 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1979).
147 See CHRIS SCHILLING, THE BODY AND SOCIAL THEORY 3 (2d ed. 2004); Nancy E. Levine,
Alternative Kinship, Marriage and Reproduction, 37 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 375, 379 (2008).
142
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body; 148 that reproductive technologies have the capacity to “challenge traditional
notions of family” which may affect the IRS’s and Tax Court’s opinions on
cases; 149 that the definition of infertility, and thus the decisions the IRS and the
Tax Court make based upon that definition, are heteronormative. 150 But she does
not identify the underlying consistency in the IRS’s and Tax Court’s hidden
normative judgments or propose avenues for reform. Instead, Pratt focuses on
whether the “facially-neutral” definition of medical care would pass constitutional
muster given its discriminatory effect. 151 Applying anthropological theory to the
inconsistencies Pratt discusses shifts the inquiry to one of analyzing the source of
these inconsistencies. Doing so ultimately reveals the unifying, underlying logic of
pre- and post-Sedgwick/Magdalin Section 213 doctrine, a logic that values
reproduction by married heterosexuals over reproduction by other social groups.
C. Lessons of Anthropological Theory
Tax exemptions or deductions are effectively government subsidies of certain
behavior or actions. 152 On one level, the outcome of Magdalin and its logic seems
consistent with the Tax Court’s and IRS’s desire to subsidize only care which treats
their definition of medical infertility. But the discriminatory results of this position
and its demonstrated inconsistencies with prior IRS doctrine suggest that other
forces are at work. Anthropological theory can help us understand those social and
cultural forces.
1. Anthropology and Reproduction
Reproductive technologies challenge our culturally determined understanding
of the body and its capacities as well as our definitions of “reproduction” and
“family;” they create situations that do not fit our existing cultural order. 153 Single
parents and gay and lesbian couples have a new means of accessing the cultural
category of parenthood because of the doors opened by reproductive
technologies. 154 The very possibility that a woman or man can have child without
an opposite-sex partner “challeng[es] the centrality of heterosexual intercourse and
the two-person, opposite gender model of parenthood[.]” 155 Surrogacy challenges
notions of kinship and destabilizes the presumed relationship between a child and

148 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1311 (identifying that Magdalin raises the question “how do we define
the term ‘of the body’, as used in section 213(d)(1)(A) . . . ?”).
149 Id. at 1325-26.
150 Id. at 1326.
151 Id. at 1338-45.
152 Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 236 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
153 See SCHILLING, supra note 147, at 3; Levine, supra note 147, at 379.
154 Rayna Rapp, Gender, Body, Biomedicine: How Some Feminist Concerns Dragged Reproduction
to the Center of Social Theory, 15 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 466, 470 (2001).
155 Levine, supra note 147, at 379.
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gestational mother as its social mother and family. 156 But the role that these
challenges play in structuring Section 213 is essentially unexplored.
Although legal scholars recognize the challenge reproductive technologies
represent to notions of the body, family, and reproduction, their scholarship tends to
stop at this observation. 157 For anthropologists, this is simply the point of
departure for the discussion, rather than the end result. Anthropological theory
allows us to address why reproductive technology is so threatening or destabilizing,
and more specifically for our purposes, why these technologies might prompt such
inconsistency in Section 213 doctrine. The Tax Court and IRS are not set up to
evaluate, on a normative level, the impacts of reproductive technologies, but their
failure to results, as we have seen, in inconsistent and discriminatory doctrine.
Anthropological theory can help explain the source of these inconsistencies and to
re-envision a coherent, consistent, and equitable Section 213 doctrine regarding
fertility treatments.
Consider, for example, the following categories for arranging thought about
reproduction:
Fertile/Infertile.
Health/Disease.
Normal/Abnormal.
Natural/Unnatural.

As subjects of scientific inquiry, these categories command an air of
objectivity. 158 It is because of this appearance of value-neutrality that these
classifications require stringent examination to ensure that their use does not result
in inequality and discrimination. 159 To explore the normative assumptions of these
terms, it is necessary to understand why they are viewed as objective and valueneutral, as well as the role culture plays in defining them. Discussions of the veiled
exercise of power, the cultural assumptions that occur in supposedly objective
sciences, the power of discourse, and labels such as fertile/infertile and
normal/abnormal are all within the purview of anthropological theory. 160
156 Id. at 381-82 (“[S]urrogacy, more unambiguously than any other NRT, introduces contractual
arrangements into private affairs, [and] fragments motherhood into genetic, gestational and social
components[.]”).
157 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1325-38.
158 See SCHILLING, supra note 147, at 71 (claiming that certain viewpoints understand the “natural as
the ‘raw material’ of social life, and sexual or racial difference is taken as prior to social differences . . .
For example, ‘woman’ and ‘man’ are ontologically stable objects which make no allowance for crosscultural or trans-historical change. [Foucault problematizes this notion, however, recognizing] the
natural [as] a construction of the social.”); see also Deborah Findlay, The Good, the Normal and the
Healthy: The Social Construction of Medical Knowledge About Women, 18 CAN. J. OF SOC. 115, 116
(1993) (“[T]he technical presentation of scientific and medical knowledge often obscures the sociocultural context so integral to the process of defining that knowledge[.]”).
159 See Findlay, supra note 158, at 116 (noting that such seeming objectivity conceals the culturallymediated process of distinguishing “which knowledge is accepted as ‘fact’ and which is deemed
‘artefact’”).
160 For an overview of legal anthropology as a sub-field, see Sally Falk Moore, Certainties Undone:
Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology, 1949-1999, 7 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 95-116,
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In applying Section 213, the IRS and Tax Court operate under a number of
assumptions of which they do not seem to be aware: first, that what is
normal/natural functioning is a constant and objectively determined classification;
second, that classifying what is medical is an objective exercise; and third, that the
body and its capacities are stable entities. Anthropological theory allows us to
problematize these notions and reveals the very real cultural influences on what we
understand to be normal/abnormal, health/disease, medical/personal, and
natural/unnatural. To fully explain these categories and their foundations in
cultural assumptions and beliefs, it is necessary to take a few steps back from our
ultimate aim and examine philosophical approaches to the body as well as medical
anthropology scholarship.
To understand the anthropology of medicine and the body one must first
grasp one of Western culture’s primary philosophical assumptions regarding the
body. 161 Western thought, particularly in the area of the body, operates in
dualisms. 162 Tracing mind-body dualism to Descartes, anthropologists and social
theorists also identify the following concept as Cartesian dualism. 163 Cartesian
dualism understands “human existence [as being] bifurcated into two realms or
substances: the bodily or material [and] . . . the mental or spiritual.” 164 Though
this distinction is not, in and of itself, a negative one, it provides the foundation for
a perception of the body as:
(1) “alien” to the individual;
(2) a force of “confinement and limitation;” and
(3) an “enemy” to the individual—a physicality which demands care and is
vulnerable to disease. 165

While there is a wealth of scholarship in this area, the importance of Western
culture’s dualistic heritage is that it allows the body to be understood as: (a)
separate from the individual, and (b) something to be managed. 166
Such dualistic thinking is not limited to our perception of the body. Dualisms
such as male/female, culture/nature, rational/magical, and normal/aberrant are
common to everyday experience. 167
Yet, such dualisms are “conceptual
95 (2001).
161 See SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE, AND THE BODY 144
(2003); Nancy Schepher-Hughes & Margaret M. Lock, The Mindful Body: A Prolegomenon to Future
Work in Medical Anthropology, in UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 208
(Peter J. Brown ed., 1998). For lack of a better term, I will speak of Western culture. Undoubtedly this
categorization overwrites nuances and lived realities of cultural experience. The term does, however,
encompass a recognized school of thought regarding medicine and an understanding of and
philosophical approach to the body. As such, for all of its faults, the term Western culture is useful in a
discussion of the body and the development of medical knowledge of the body.
162 See Schepher-Hughes & Lock, supra note 161.
163 Id.
164 BORDO, supra note 161, at 144.
165 Id. at 145.
166 Id. at 144-51.
167 See Scheper-Hughes & Lock, supra note 161, at 208; see also Ortner, supra note 131, at 71.
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categories” rather than empirical truths. 168 Closer to home, Section 213 creates the
dualistic relationship of medical/personal. 169 Undoubtedly, there are differences
between men and women or products of culture and of the natural world, but our
culturally mediated understanding of these entities structures our beliefs that they
are fundamentally opposed, mutually exclusive, hierarchically ranked, or even
clearly dichotomous. 170 Once again, there is a wealth of scholarship on the
existence and effect of these dualisms, but the key point for our discussion is to
recognize: (a) the pervasiveness of dualistic thinking; and (b) that our
understanding of these dualisms—even their very existence—is culturally
constructed. Such dualisms operate extensively in both defining subjects of
medical knowledge and fueling the perception of medical science as being removed
from culture. 171
Science commands an air of objectivity, of being separate from the world of
culture and social biases. 172 Anthropology teaches us, however, that science and
medical knowledge are not so divorced from culture. Medical anthropology
provides a theoretical base from which to problematize notions of what is medical
and its corollary categories of natural and normal functioning.
As a point of departure, medical anthropology recognizes the sociocultural
nature of all medical systems. 173 To reinforce the notion that a medical system—
be it shamanism or the U.S. healthcare system—exists within a given cultural
system, anthropology refers to each medical system as an ethnomedicine. 174 What
most would term “medicine”—“the medicine of hospitals and mainstream doctors
of the industrialized world” 175—is reconceptualized as “biomedicine,” drawing
attention to biomedicine’s reliance upon theoretical principles of biological
sciences, as opposed to another worldview. 176 The identifying characteristics of
biomedicine include:
(1) “The individual (rather than the collectivity) is the focus of treatment;
(2) emphasis is on the somatic or physical illness and treatment . . .;
(3) the sick or deviants are to be institutionalized;

168

Ortner, supra note 131, at 71-72.
See I.R.C. § 213 (2004); Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(ii) (1979).
170 Ortner, supra note 131, at 71.
171 See Scheper-Hughes & Lock, supra note 161, at 208-21 (discussing the process of learning
medical knowledge and identifying operating dualisms); see also Findlay, supra note 158, at 116
(fact/artefact distinction).
172 JOHN M. JANZEN, THE SOCIAL FABRIC OF HEALTH: AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 188 (2002) (“In the Western industrial world, science is considered to be the source
and standard of medical knowledge. Science is commonly understood to be knowledge that is somehow
systematized, orderly, and established through widespread empirical observation, laboratory research, or
experimentation under specially controlled conditions[.]”).
173 See id. at 214 (noting that all medical traditions are “ethnomedicine[s]” and identifying the
“culture of biomedicine”) (internal quotation omitted).
174 Id.
175 Id. at 4.
176 Id.
169
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(4) [there is] a mechanistic metaphor of the body—the body is a machine
that may be repaired or receive replacement parts [drawing upon
mind/body dualism]; and
(5) medicine is predominantly attuned to a ‘single cause’ etiology.” 177

Recognizing that our medical system is culturally grounded and that it operates
from a particular worldview lays the groundwork for challenging the objectivity of
what we understand to be medical, disease, or normal functioning.
Oft-invoked in the anthropology of medicine and the body, Michél Foucault’s
theories of the body, discourse, and disciplinary and legal systems are extremely
influential to social theory. His theories are particularly helpful in illustrating the
roles medicine and law play in perpetuating inequality through their normalizing
discourse. Central to Foucault’s conception of power is the “panopticon,” Jeremy
Bentham’s famous idea of a prison with a central tower and inward facing cells. 178
Each prisoner is visible to the tower, as well as to the others, but no prisoner can
see into the tower, creating extensive visibility and the capacity for concealed
observation. 179 Critical to this prison model is the fact that because the prisoners
cannot see into the tower, they are never truly sure whether the warden is observing
them. 180 This reality, combined with their visibility to each other, “assures the
automatic functioning of power” 181—i.e., the prisoners grow to self-regulate their
behavior because they may always be observed but can never know if they are
observed in fact. 182
Foucault expands the notion of the panopticon into a theory of modern
operations of power. For Foucault, medicine, education, and the workplace are all
modern-day panopticons. 183 Modern power, drawing upon dualistic thinking,
functions through a normalizing process. 184 Most specifically for our inquiry,
advances in medical knowledge increase the visibility of the human body,
recreating it as a subject of knowledge and scrutiny. 185 Increased knowledge and
visibility fuels a normalizing project: classifying individuals as usual/deviant,
normal/abnormal, and the like. 186 At its core, modern power homogenizes and
normalizes, only individualizing aberrant, deviant behavior. 187 Applied to our
current inquiry, Foucault’s theories explain that when the medical profession, the

177

JANZEN, supra note 172, at 215.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200 (1st ed., 1977)
[hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE].
179 Id.
180 Id. at 200-02.
181 Id. at 201.
182 Id. at 201.
183 Id. at 228.
184 FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE supra note 178, at 199 (“[A]ll the authorities exercising individual
control function according to a double mode; that of binary division and branding[.]”).
185 Id. at 184-85, 199, 203.
186 Id. at 199-203.
187 Id. at 193-203.
178
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Tax Court, or the IRS classify behavior or biological processes as normal or
natural, they are engaged in an exercise of power which is culturally mediated.
Another key aspect of Foucault’s theory of modern power is that it is
diffuse. 188 Power is not held by one group and denied to another. 189 Rather, “it is
a moving substrate of force relations . . . [which] comes from everywhere.” 190 As
every individual learns and internalizes classifications of what is normal or
abnormal, usual or deviant, he or she perpetuates the normalizing force of
power. 191 In doing so, each individual ensures the survival of inequalities created
by the normalizing process, all the while largely unaware of that fact. 192
Revealing the source and mechanisms of inequality therefore requires focused
analysis.
Foucault’s work is extensive and his impact on social theory profound. Thus,
this brief introduction inevitably excludes many of the intricacies of his work. At
their core, Foucault’s theories of discipline and normalization provide us with these
critical ideas:
(1) There is a certain inevitability to power—power is not simply
something exercised from above in a clear and visible way. Rather, it is
internalized and exercised by those who are also its subjects, though they
are largely unaware of its operation.
(2) Classifications of normal, natural, and medical are exercises of
power—modern power frequently operates through culturally mediated,
homogenizing, and normalizing processes which are produced by and
reinforce such labels.

What these crucial points teach us is that when the Tax Court and IRS understand
one form of reproduction as medical, normal, or natural, and another form simply
as personal choice, they are engaged in a value-laden exercise, even if they are
unaware of that fact. Such classifications are mechanisms of power which
perpetuate inequalities grounded in cultural conceptions of a person or behavior.
Medicine and definitions of normalcy are not the only culturally mediated
categories at play in this discussion. The body itself and what qualifies as its
natural or normal functioning are also fluid concepts. 193 This principle

188 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 89-94 (1978) [hereinafter
FOUCAULT, HISTORY].
189 Id.
190 Id. at 93; See also FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 178, at 203 (“Power has its principle not so
much in a person as in . . . an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which
individuals are caught up . . . Consequently, it does not matter who exercises power . . . Similarly it does
not matter what motive animates him[.]”).
191 FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 178, at 193-203; FOUCAULT, HISTORY, supra note 188, at 8994.
192 FOUCAULT, HISTORY, supra note 188, at 89-94.
193 See JANZEN, supra note 172, at 192; SCHILLING, supra note 147, at 3; see also Schepher-Hughes
& Lock, supra note 161, at 144 (“What is considered normal—in behavior, thinking, or even physical
attributes—is cultural.”).
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undermines the IRS’s and Tax Court’s operating assumptions that the body and its
capacities are static and separate from cultural influence.
While the body is something that is knowable to medicine—the subject of
classifications of normal or aberrant—it is also a moving target whose meaning
shifts. 194 Writing specifically of the effects of ever-evolving medical technologies,
social theorist Chris Schilling writes:
Quite simply, the body is potentially no longer subject to the constraints
and limitations that once characterized its existence. Nevertheless, as well
as providing people with the potential to control their bodies, the situation
has also stimulated among individuals a heightened degree of reflexivity
about what the body is, and an uncertainty about how it should be
controlled. As science facilitates greater degrees of intervention into the
body, it destabilizes our knowledge of what bodies are, and runs ahead of
our ability to make moral judgments about how far science should be
allowed to reconstruct the body.
Indeed, it would not be too much of an oversimplification to argue that the
more we have been able to control and alter the limits of the body, the
greater has been our uncertainty about what constitutes an individual’s
body, and what is ‘natural’ about a body. For example, artificial
insemination and in vitro fertilization have enabled reproduction to be
separated from the corporeal relations which have traditionally defined
heterosexual experience. 195

The weight of these observations comes to bear heavily on Section 213 doctrine
regarding fertility treatments.
As the body and its natural or normal capacities are unstable, so too are what
qualifies as medical and disease. With increasing medical knowledge comes new
subjects of classification, new perceptions of what is normal or aberrant, and new
normalizing discourses. 196 To highlight the fluid nature of disease, consider the
following: The World Health Organization compiles and disseminates the
“International Classification of Disease.” 197 Used by practitioners and health
insurance companies, 198 the
classifications of symptoms, syndromes, signs, and diseases or conditions
represent an attempt to codify for practitioners those conditions whose
diagnoses and therapies are deemed legitimate for reimbursement. The
aura of reality given to a cluster of signs and symptoms when they are
194

SCHILLING, supra note 147, at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
196 See supra text accompanying notes 173-87.
197 JANZEN, supra note 172, at 196.
198 The Tax Court even acknowledges that it looks to such classifications to determine whether
something qualifies as disease. See O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 58 (2010) (“We have also
considered a condition’s listing in a diagnostic reference text as grounds for treating the condition as a,
‘disease’, without inquiry into the condition’s etiology.”).
195
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named as a disease is strengthened if this naming legitimizes the payment
of funds for treatment by medical practitioners and institutions. 199

New diseases must, therefore, gain widespread acceptance as such before they can
gain an “aura of reality.” 200 But by what processes does a “cluster of signs and
symptoms” come to be classified as a disease and thus become the subject of
medical knowledge and management? 201
The process of making subjects medical or re-envisioning life experiences as
“medical problems” is known to anthropologists as medicalization.202
Biomedicine views disease as “‘deviation’ from a ‘biological norm,’” 203 but that
norm may be culturally constructed. Even infertility, the subject of our current
inquiry, was not cast as a disease until the 1960s and 1970s, when couples delayed
trying to conceive and research into these couples’ resulting difficulties boomed. 204
When increasing medical knowledge combines with cultural valuations of the
worth of a behavior or characteristics, what is “badness [becomes] sickness.” 205
Classifications which seem objective—what is disease and what qualifies as a
subject of medical inquiry or treatment—are in fact culturally and historically
contingent and therefore subject to change.
Taken as a whole, these theories illuminate the culturally influenced nature of
what we believe to be medical, disease, and normal functioning. As such, medical
anthropology, anthropology of the body, and Foucault crack the foundation of the
IRS’s and Tax Court’s operating assumptions. What is normal/natural functioning
is neither constant nor objectively determined; medicine is not a wholly objective
enterprise, and the body and its capacities are culturally mediated, dynamic entities.
Yet these observations alone cannot explain the inconsistencies of Section 213
doctrine. The scholarship of Mary Douglas gives us a rich vocabulary to explain
why society tends to narrow rules in the face of situations that challenge what is
“normal,” as did the Tax Court and IRS in Sedgwick and Magdalin.
In her seminal work, Purity and Danger, Douglas writes of notions of the
culturally determined nature of concepts such as purity and contagion:
If we abstract pathogenicity and hygiene from our notion of dirt, we are left
with the old definition of dirt as matter out of place . . . . It implies two
conditions: a set of ordered relations and a contravention of that order. Dirt

199

JANZEN, supra note 172, at 198-99 (emphasis added).
Id.
201 Id.
202 Gay Becker & Robert D. Nachtigall, Eager for Medicalisation: The Social Production of
Infertility as a Disease, 14 SOC. OF HEALTH & ILLNESS 456-471 (1992); Adele E. Clarke et al.,
Biomedicalization: Technoscientific Transformations of Health, Illness, and U.S. Biomedicine, 68 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 161, 194 (2003).
203 Findlay, supra note 158, at 121.
204 Becker, supra note 202, at 457.
205 Clarke et al., supra note 202, at 161 (quoting Conrad and Schneider (1980)).
200
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Where there is dirt there is

Essentially, culture creates a series of classifications—right/wrong,
clean/unclean—which provide a system through which a person can perceive the
world. 207 Culture is that system, the repository of “standardized values of a
community [that] mediates the experience of individuals.” 208
Recognizing that culture acts as a system that mediates an individual’s
experience or as providing a means of ordering the world to make it intelligible,
Douglas then explains why challenges to that order are so poorly received. Where
there is order, there must be disorder. 209 Culture, as a classificatory scheme, “must
give rise to anomalies, [it] must confront events which seem to defy its
assumptions.” 210 These anomalies prompt a reification of our conceptualization of
what is ordered, what is right, and what fits. 211 But disorder and anomaly, things
that defy or challenge cultural categories, also threaten the existence of the
system. 212 Douglas writes: “Though we seek to create order, we do not simply
condemn disorder. We recognise that it is destructive to existing patterns; also that
it has potentiality. It symbolises both danger and power.” 213 In short, “anomalous
events may be labeled dangerous.” 214 When faced with that which threatens order,
individuals frequently respond by reifying the validity and boundaries of the
existing system and shunning that which challenges them. 215
2. Section 213 Doctrine in Cultural Context
None of the foregoing discussion discounts that there are observable,
empirical realities that medicine or the Tax Court and IRS can classify as medical,
natural, or normal. Even a common observer can distinguish between surgery to
fix a shattered femur and an elective nose-job. Though both surgeries involve
medical care, the former seems more necessary and more worthy of subsidy than
the latter. Essentially, we readily, and seemingly without objection, feel that
normalcy for the first patient requires fixing her leg, whereas the second patient can
live a normal life, even with a nose with which she is unhappy. Though we are
206 MARY DOUGLAS PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND TABOO
44 (2002).
207 Id. at 44-48. Further, “[p]erceiving is not a matter of passively allowing an organ—say of sight
or hearing—to receive a ready-made impression from without . . . It is generally agreed that all our
impressions are schematically determined from the start . . . As learning proceeds objects are named.
Their names then affect the way they are perceived next time[.]” Id. at 45.
208 Id. at 48.
209 See id. at 117.
210 Id. at 48.
211 DOUGLAS, supra note 206, at 48 (“[A] rule of avoiding anomalous things affirms and strengthens
the definitions to which they do not conform[.]”).
212 Id. at 117.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 49.
215 Id. at 49, 160-72.
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working with empirical realities—observable qualities of the body and its
capacities—we make judgments throughout the process as to which conditions
warrant care and which deviations we feel compelled to treat or even view as
deviations. Reproductive care operates at the boundaries of our understanding of
the body, making apparent value judgments that normally occur without incident.
We have seen four seeming inconsistencies in Section 213 doctrine:
(1) Inconsistent aggregation of the body;
(2) Failure to consistently recognize fertility as a function of the body;
(3) Inconsistent application of the “Substitute for Normal Functioning”
Doctrine; and
(4) Inconsistent requirement of the presence of disease.

It was not until faced with the fact patterns of Sedgwick and Magdalin, however,
that these inconsistencies emerged.
Anthropological theory provides an
explanation for both the timing and existence of these inconsistencies.
Sedgwick and Magdalin exposed the value judgments with which the IRS and
Tax Court approached the deductibility of fertility treatments under Section 213.
Surrogacy and the use of reproductive technologies to enable a homosexual man to
be a biological parent without a female partner challenged the agency’s and the
court’s commonly held assumptions of kinship, family structure, and the definition
of reproduction as a heterosexual act involving two people. 216 When faced with
factual situations which challenged their heteronormative, marriage-centric
conception of reproduction, the IRS and Tax Court responded as Mary Douglas
would predict: they reified their value judgments, denying the benefits of Section
213 to persons or couples who do not fit the mold formed by these judgments. Yet,
this realization does not explain the seeming inconsistencies between the arguments
employed by the IRS and the outcomes given by the Tax Court in Sedgwick and
Magdalin and other IRS pronouncements.
The seeming inconsistencies between pre- and post-Sedgwick/Magdalin
Section 213 doctrine dissolve when one recognizes that pre-Sedgwick/Magdalin
doctrine was not as value-neutral as it appeared. Rather, the same heteronormative,
marriage-centric judgments and assumptions were at work pre-Sedgwick/Magdalin,
and it was the very challenge to those assumptions that Magdalin and the
Sedgwicks represented which brought them into relief. 217 Re-evaluating each of
the seeming inconsistencies between pre- and post-Sedgwick/Magdalin Section 213
doctrine with the tools of anthropological theory clarifies this point.
Magdalin caused the IRS and the Tax Court to reveal their value-laden
conception of natural or normal reproduction. The IRS’s argument that Magdalin
could have children “naturally” 218 assumes that only heterosexual reproduction is

216
217
218

See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1325-27; see also Levine, supra note 147, at 376-82.
See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1328-36.
Brief for Appellee at 8, Magdalin v. Comm’r, 2009 WL 6809176 (1st Cir. 2009) (No. 09-1153).
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natural. 219 Just as Foucault argues, the normalizing effect of the label natural or
normal conceals a culturally mediated value judgment. One could view any
reproduction assisted by medical technologies to be unnatural or abnormal, but this
is not where the IRS and the Tax Court drew the line. 220 Rather, they chose to
define natural or normal reproduction based on the sexuality of the person
attempting to have a child: married, heterosexual reproduction—even when
assisted by reproductive technologies—is considered natural, while a medically
fertile homosexual person’s use of the same technologies constitutes an unnatural
personal choice. 221 Thus, Magdalin allows us to see the heteronormative
definition of natural or normal which had theretofore lain dormant in Section 213
doctrine. This distinction plays a role in each of the seeming inconsistencies
between Sedgwick and Magdalin and other IRS pronouncements.
The IRS’s and the Tax Court’s failure to consistently recognize fertility as a
function of the body reflects its gendered view of reproduction. Recall that
male/female is a common dualism in Western culture. 222 Frequently, that dualism
overlaps with the culture/nature dualism, one which identifies men as further
removed from the natural world and women as bound to it. 223 The relationship of
these dualisms reflects and perpetuates the view that women are inherently more
tied to and defined by their reproductive roles. 224 When the IRS argued that
reproduction is not a function of a male body, it articulated this dualism, illustrating
that the IRS and Tax Court have a gendered view of reproduction. 225 The IRS
likely held this view in the IRS Information Letter, which identified fertility as a
function of the body; Magdalin simply exposes it as an underlying assumption.
The IRS’s and the Tax Court’s inconsistent requirement of the presence of
disease derives from its attempt to make the medical/personal distinction one that
protects a heteronormative, marriage-centric conception of reproduction and
family. It is the outgrowth of an attempt to cloak the devaluation of single or
homosexual parenthood with the supposed objectivity of science. By requiring the
presence of an underlying disease for fertility treatment to be medical rather than
personal, the IRS and Tax Court drew a line between medical and personal that
discriminates based on sexuality and or marital status. 226 A fertility treatment is no
less a medical procedure when the patient is homosexual or heterosexual, married
or unmarried—the nature of the procedure does not change. Yet the IRS’s and the

219 See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1336-40 (noting that this concept of natural casts homosexual
reproduction as unnatural).
220 See id. at 1328-37; see also Robertson, supra note 11, at 331.
221 See Robertson, supra note 11, at 331.
222 See Ortner, supra note 131.
223 Id. at 71-72.
224 Id. at 71-76.
225 See Magdalin v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 491 (2008) (IRS’s argument that fertility is not a
function of the male body).
226 Id.; see also Pratt, supra note 7, at 1336.
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Tax Court’s re-reading of Section 213 to require the presence of an underlying
disease both reflects and perpetuates their belief that reproduction should occur
between—and be readily subsidized for—married, heterosexual persons.
Taken together, the IRS’s and Tax Court’s selective application of the
“substitute for normal functioning” doctrine and aggregation of the body allows
them to perpetuate their heteronormative view of natural or normal reproduction,
as well as their marriage-centric values.
Pre-Sedgwick/Magdalin IRS
pronouncements specifically allow a taxpayer to aggregate his or her body with that
of an egg and or sperm donor’s body. Post-Sedgwick/Magdalin, the Tax Court and
IRS are unwilling to permit such aggregation when the taxpayers are either
attempting to use surrogacy to treat their medical infertility or are single or
homosexual persons using reproductive technologies to have a child. In rejecting
the “substitute for normal functioning” principles and disallowing aggregation for
the Sedgwicks, the Tax Court rejected a reproductive model that explicitly
challenges kinship structures by bringing a third person—rather than simply that
person’s egg or sperm—into the reproductive act. In rejecting these principles for
Magdalin, the Tax Court failed to recognize the validity and value of homosexual
reproduction, instead perpetuating their heteronormative view of reproduction in
Section 213. Stating the point another way, when faced with challenges to the
cultural order, the IRS and the Tax Court rejected what they understood to be
subversive and reified the existing order. 227
Nothing in the Sedgwick or Magdalin opinions suggests that the IRS or Tax
Court are deliberately and insidiously attempting to deny equal treatment under the
Tax Code to singles or gay and lesbian couples seeking parenthood.228
Nevertheless, the Tax Court and the IRS are using value-laden assumptions, which
elevate heterosexuality and a married, heterosexual model of the family over other
family models. However, recognizing the existence of such assumptions only gets
us part way to remedying the discriminatory effects of their operation.
Anthropology instructed us that where the IRS and Tax Court assumed
objectivity—in the categories of normal, natural and medical—there are inherent
value-laden judgments and assumptions. In doing so, it drew attention to the
operation of such judgments and assumptions in Section 213 doctrine. The IRS
and Tax Court cannot avoid working with such categories and thus cannot escape
making value judgments as they work with Section 213. Therefore, the only way
to ensure a non-discriminatory Section 213 doctrine is to recognize the inevitability
of such value judgments and adopt new ones that embrace broader definitions of

227

DOUGLAS, supra note 206, at 117, 160-72.
But see, Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Infertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J.
1007 (1996). (writing that the overall regulation of reproductive technologies and social perception of
their appropriate use from this perspective, asserting that prohibitions against the use of reproductive
technologies to such persons reflects a deliberate agenda of continuing the subordination of women and
ensuring the primacy of a heterosexual model of the family).
228
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reproduction, proper function, what is medical, and who, ultimately, makes a
suitable parent.
III. PRODUCING NEW VALUES: MOVING TOWARD A NON-DISCRIMINATORY
SECTION 213 DOCTRINE
Once we recognize the inevitability of the Tax Court and IRS making value
judgments at the intersection of Section 213 and fertility treatments, the next step is
to ensure that the judgments they make are the right ones. In using the term right, I
align myself with a growing percentage of the population that recognizes that a
family does not have to mean a mother, a father, and child. 229 Rather, a family can
consist of a child with two mothers, two fathers, or simply one parent. Thus, when
I speak of the right value judgments, I mean those which do not judge a person’s
ability to be a parent based upon his or her sexuality, gender, or relationship status.
Reproductive technologies and social mores have both evolved, opening the door to
biological parenthood for a broader range of individuals than ever before. The Tax
Code should evolve accordingly.
Informed by anthropological theory and an understanding of Section 213
doctrine, we have an opportunity to recreate Section 213 into a doctrine that: (1) is
internally consistent; (2) is adapted to the changing realities of the body’s meaning
and capacities; (3) reflects changing social mores; and (4) provides opportunities to
all taxpayers to benefit from Section 213, regardless of their gender, sexuality or
relationship status. Furthermore, this revamping of Section 213 requires no
overhaul of the doctrine, but simply a shift in the value judgments that had
heretofore operated without recognition. Thus, each of the following proposals for
reform builds upon existing Section 213 doctrine while re-envisioning the IRS’s
and Tax Court’s operating judgments and assumptions, thereby grounding the
proposed reforms in the Code itself.
A. Recognizing Fertility as a Function of All Bodies
Beginning with the least controversial shift first, the IRS and the Tax Court
should replace their gendered view of reproduction with one that recognizes
reproduction as a function of all bodies, male and female. The IRS stated this exact
principle, 230 but was operating with a gendered view of reproduction that
drastically narrowed the scope of the IRS’s previous pronouncement. 231 By
replacing a gendered view of reproduction with a gender-neutral view, fertility
treatments fall under the structure/function prong regardless of patient’s gender.
229 Inevitably, this conception of right values will isolate some. For a discussion of changing social
mores on what constitutes a family, see PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE
OF NEW FAMILIES (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1802/decline-marriage-risenew-families; see also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, SUPPORT FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE EDGES UPWARD
(Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://people-press.org/report/662/same-sex-marriage.
230 I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2005-0102 (Mar. 29, 2005).
231 Brief for Appellee, Magdalin v. Comm’r, 2009 WL 6809176 (1st Cir. 2009) (No. 09-1153).
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Doing so, however, only partially addresses the discriminatory effects of Section
213 doctrine. The Tax Court and the IRS could still decide that reproduction is not
a covered function of homosexual or single bodies, using the Magdalin disease
requirement or the medically fertile/medically infertile distinction to perpetuate its
heteronormative, marriage-centric view of reproduction. Thus, further reform is
necessary to ensure that all persons can deduct fertility treatments, regardless of
their sexuality or relationship status.
B. Reconceptualizing Infertility
Recall that IRS Pub. 502 makes treatments aimed at “overcoming an inability
to have children” deductible. 232 The IRS Private Letter Ruling held that the costs
of egg donation were deductible because egg donation is a “procedure [whose]
purpose [is to] facilitat[e] pregnancy by overcoming infertility.” 233
A
heterosexual, married couple can deduct the costs of fertility treatment even when
there is no discernible organic etiology, suggesting that the IRS and Tax Court
judge the presence of infertility simply by the end result: an inability to have a child
without assistance. 234 Nothing in these pronouncements explicitly prohibits a
medically fertile single person or a homosexual couple from deducting the costs of
treatments to overcome their inability to have children, yet current Section 213
doctrine narrows this broad language because of its underlying judgments and
assumptions.
The Tax Court’s and IRS’s bias toward married, heterosexual reproduction
creates a concept of “infertility” that excludes an inability to have a child because
of a person’s sexuality or relationship status. 235 To create a non-discriminatory
Section 213, the Tax Court and IRS must abandon this value judgment.

232

I.R.S. Pub. 502, at *10 (Dec. 9, 2008).
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-18-017 (May 2, 2003).
234 Pratt, supra note 7, at 1321.
235 For examples of heteronormative definitions of fertility, the likes of which the IRS and Tax
Court
adopt,
see
Infertility,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVICES,
http://www.womenshealth.gov/faq/infertility.cfm. (last updated Jul. 1, 2009) (defining infertility as “not
being able to get pregnant after one year of trying. Or, six months, if a woman is 35 or older. Women
who can get pregnant but are unable to stay pregnant may also be infertile.”); Infertility, NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/infertility.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2010) (using the definition of “not being able to become pregnant after a year of trying. If a woman
keeps having miscarriages, it is also called infertility . . . About a third of the time, infertility can be
traced to the woman. In another third of cases, it is because of the man. The rest of the time, it is because
of both partners or no cause is found.”); Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility, AMERICAN
SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, http://www.asrm.org/awards/index.aspx?id=3012 (last visited
Nov. 22, 2010) (stating that infertility is “a disease of the reproductive system that impairs one of the
body’s most basic functions: the conception of children. Conception is a complicated process that
depends upon many factors: on the production of healthy sperm by the man and healthy eggs by the
woman; unblocked fallopian tubes that allow the sperm to reach the egg; the sperm’s ability to fertilize
the egg when they meet; the ability of the fertilized egg (embryo) to become implanted in the woman’s
uterus; and sufficient embryo quality. Finally, for the pregnancy to continue to full term, the embryo
must be healthy and the woman’s hormonal environment adequate for its development. When just one of
these factors is impaired, infertility can result.”).
233
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The Tax Court and the IRS must instead embrace a broader definition of
fertility that allows taxpayers to deduct medical expenses for medical infertility, as
well as functional infertility—i.e., a person’s inability to conceive a child naturally
because of his or her sexual orientation or relationship status. 236
Adopting such a notion of infertility replaces existing IRS and Tax Court
assumptions and value judgments with ones that bring Section 213 doctrine into
line with evolving notions of family and the shifting capacities of the body
permitted by reproductive technologies. Functional infertility, as a concept,
embraces the idea that infertility resulting from a person’s relationship status or
sexuality is as equally worthy of treatment as is medical infertility. Thus,
functional infertility requires that the IRS and Tax Court abandon their
heteronormative view of the meaning of natural or normal. Instead, functional
fertility requires the IRS and Tax Court to adopt the view that reproduction through
the use of ARTs is natural and normal when used by homosexuals and
heterosexuals alike. The concept also requires the IRS and Tax Court to let go of
their marriage-centric conception of reproduction.
As functional fertility
recognizes as infertility the infertility caused by a person’s being single, it severs
the relationship between marriage and the deductibility of fertility treatments
currently embedded in Section 213 doctrine. At its core, embracing functional
infertility would require the Tax Court and IRS to abandon the value judgment that
only heterosexual, married persons are suited to be parents, and therefore that only
those persons are worthy of receiving subsidies for fertility treatment. In its stead
comes the idea that all persons are equally capable of being parents and worthy of
receiving help in that process.
Once the Tax Court and IRS embrace a conception of functional infertility
and adopt the new value judgments and assumptions it requires, fertility treatments
will be deductible for all persons. For example, a man, be he single or a partner in
a homosexual couple, could deduct the costs of egg donation, IVF, and surrogacy
as treatment for his functional infertility under the first prong of Section 213. A
medically fertile woman could deduct sperm donation and artificial insemination or
IVF costs as treatment for her functional infertility, be it attributable to her status as
a single person or her properly functioning sexuality which results in an inability to
have a child with the partner of her choice. Though this reform achieves our goal,
it leaves untouched the inconsistency of the Magdalin disease requirement, and
thus our work continues.

236 I reject the term dysfertility advanced by Ikemoto, supra note 218, and embraced by Pratt, supra
note 7, at 1327, as it implies that there is something dysfunctional about that person’s single status or
sexuality which results in his/her infertility.
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C. Restoring Consistency: Removing the “Disease as Precursor to Deductibility”
Requirement
To repair Section 213’s internal inconsistency, the IRS and Tax Court must
remove the Magdalin disease requirement that makes the presence of a disease a
precursor to deductibility even under the structure/function prong.
This
requirement was an outgrowth of the IRS’s and Tax Court’s attempt to make the
medical/personal distinction one which fit their heteronormative, marriage-centric
conception of reproduction and family. Once the Tax Court and IRS replace these
values with ones that equally value all forms of parenthood and notions of family,
the Magdalin disease requirement becomes an unnecessary relic of pre-reform
Section 213. Requiring the existence of an organic pathology as a prerequisite for
deductibility under Section 213 conflicts with existing doctrine. Support for
removal of this requirement lies both in IRS pronouncements, as well as the recent
Tax Court opinion of O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner. 237
Previous analysis of IRS pronouncements regarding the deductibility of
reproductive care and fertility treatments under Section 213 made clear that the IRS
never required the presence of an underlying disease for medical care such as a
vasectomy or an abortion to be deductible. 238 Treasury Regulation 1.2131(e)(1)(ii) itself expressly states that “obstetrical expenses . . . are deemed to be for
the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body and are therefore
paid for medical care[.]” 239 A concurring opinion in O’Donnabhain reinforces
that the primarily for provision of Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1) does nothing to weaken
this statement or existing pronouncements.
In his concurring opinion in O’Donnabhain, Judge Holmes directly addresses
whether Regulation 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) operates to require the presence of an
underlying disease as a precursor to deductibility of medical care that would
otherwise satisfy the structure/function prong of Section 213. If a procedure
satisfies the structure/function prong of Section 213, 240 the only relevant question,
writes Holmes, is whether the procedures constitute non-deductible cosmetic
surgery. 241 This is the case because, as Holmes states, the primarily for provision
of 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) applies only to medical expenses incurred under the first
prong. 242 To read that aspect of the regulation as applying to expenses qualifying

237 O’Donnabhain required the Tax Court to consider the deductibility of the taxpayer’s sex
reassignment procedures. Holding for the taxpayer, the court engaged in extensive discussion of the
meaning of the terms, disease and treatment. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010). In
November 2011, the IRS issued an Action on Decision memorandum in which it acquiesced to the Tax
Court decision.
238 See supra text accompanying notes 30-66, 131-140 for a discussion of the invalidity of this
requirement.
239 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1979) (emphasis added).
240 O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 86 (Holmes, J. concurring).
241 Id.
242 Id.
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under the structure/function prong would “overturn even the IRS’s settled opinion
that procedures as diverse as abortion [and] . . . vasectomies . . . qualify as ‘medical
care’ because they affect a structure or function of the body.” 243 Under this logic,
which is in line with other IRS pronouncements in the area, the Magdalin disease
requirement must be discarded as an inconsistency attributable to previously held
value judgments and ill-founded operating assumptions. Thus, striking the
Magdalin disease requirement would bring Section 213 doctrine into line with a
proper reading of the statutory language, binding Treasury Regulations, and the
weight of existing IRS pronouncement.
Reforming Section 213 doctrine to remove the invalid Magdalin disease
requirement accomplishes another result: it allows female taxpayers to deduct
fertility treatments under the structure/function prong of Section 213. Fertility
treatments expressly affect the structure and function of a woman’s body; removing
the disease as a precursor to deductibility under the structure/function prong
removes that barrier to deductibility of such treatment costs. Though this is a step
toward creating a non-discriminatory Section 213 doctrine, it is, however,
insufficient.
To treat the removal of the Magdalin disease requirement as the only
necessary reform would not fully address the heteronormativity, marriage-centric
focus, and gender bias of the IRS’s operating value judgments. Absent reforms that
recognize functional infertility as infertility, a medically fertile woman could still
face challenges to deducting her full treatment costs, such as those of sperm
donation. 244 Unless we also reform the IRS’s and Tax Court’s gendered notions of
reproduction—making fertility a covered function of male bodies—simply
removing the Magdalin disease requirement does not extend deductibility of
fertility treatments to single men or homosexual couples, as the fertility treatments
they utilize would not directly affect the structure or a covered function of their
own bodies. At its core, removal of the Magdalin disease requirement would, by
eradicating the heteronormativity currently embedded in the medical/personal
distinction, indicate a shift toward recognizing the validity and value of single and
homosexual parenthood. To fully embrace this new value and ensure that Section
213 does not discriminate on the basis of a person’s gender, sexuality, or marital
status, the IRS and Tax Court must adopt all of the proposed reforms.
Each of the proposed reforms to Section 213 doctrine—recognition of
fertility as a function of all bodies, embracing the concept of functional infertility,
and removing disease as a precursor to deductibility under the structure/function
prong—combines teachings of both anthropological theory and Section 213

243

Id. at 98 (internal citations omitted).
See Pratt, supra note 7, at 1324 (discussing how the IRS and Tax Court could prevent
deductibility of sperm donation costs when a woman is medically-fertile as a “woman’s body, whether
fertile or infertile, can never supply sperm” so donor costs do not treat a disease or directly affect the
structure or function of the woman’s body).
244
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doctrine itself. Embracing anthropological theory, these reforms acknowledge two
essential facts:
(1) perceptions of the body, reproduction, and normalcy are fluid and
value-laden; and
(2) value judgments at the intersection of Section 213 doctrine and
reproductive technologies are both necessary and inevitable.

Rather than attempting to skirt such value judgments or assume, as the Tax Court
and IRS have, that these judgments can be avoided, the proposed reforms
deliberately restructure the values of the Tax Court and IRS to re-envision Section
213 as a non-discriminatory doctrine. Adopting new value judgments makes an
overhaul of Section 213 unnecessary, as it is the latent value judgments, rather than
the actual doctrine, that effectuate discriminatory outcomes. Thus, by combining
the teachings of anthropological theory and Section 213 doctrine, we can reenvision Section 213 as a consistent, non-discriminatory doctrine that reflects our
evolving understandings of family and the body’s new capacities, all the while
remaining in the familiar realm of the Code.
CONCLUSION
Employing the lens of anthropological theory to examine Section 213
provides new insights. Sedgwick and Magdalin ceased to be simply inconsistent
with prior doctrine and became analytical tools, revealing the IRS’s and Tax
Court’s underlying heteronormative, marriage-centric value judgments. Where the
Tax Court and IRS are ill-equipped to analyze or even recognize the culturally
mediated nature and normative impact of concepts and terms they so readily use—
medical/personal, the body, normal, natural, reproduction—anthropological theory
steps in to provide this missing capacity. Most importantly, anthropological theory
forces a realization that considering the deductibility of fertility treatments under
Section 213 ultimately requires us to make value judgments about whose
reproduction we value and who we deem to be proper parents. By making us
recognize the inevitability of engaging in such judgments, anthropological theory
provides a welcome opportunity to deliberately change those judgments and to
reform a discriminatory doctrine into one that values and supports an individual’s
right to make a family as he or she desires, regardless of that individual’s gender,
sexuality or marital status.

